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CHAPTER IV
WARSHIPS AND THEIR CREWS
THE BASES OF IMMUNITY
In a sense it is artificial to discuss the status of the crews of
warships separately from that of land forces. Visits of warships
to foreign ports have, however, been common in time of peace as
well as war; on the other hand, visits of land forces on foreign
territory have been relatively rare. Hence jurisdictional problems
involving seamen have arisen much more frequently and judg-
ments regarding appropriate solutions can be predicated on the
extensive comments of text writers, judicial decisions and the
practice of states. Again, the rules of international law governing
the status of the crews of warships have developed quite in-
dependently, without much reference to the problems of land
forces. This development has, moreover, been influenced, to a
degree not easily measured, by concepts and analogies (e.g., the
fiction of extraterritoriality and the status of merchant seamen)
which have played a lesser or no discernible role in the formula-
tion of the rules with respect to land forces. This independent
development may on the whole have been unfortunate since a
higher degree of cross-pollination perhaps could have contributed
to more satisfactory solutions in both areas. There are neverthe-
less marked differences between the situation of the crews of war-
ships in foreign waters and ports and that of land forces on
foreign territory. These differences suggest that variations in the
rules governing status may be desirable. It seems on the whole
better to deal first with the status of the crews of warships, but
to postpone extended discussion of some of the issues raised to
later chapters.
In foreign territorial waters and ports, warships and their
crews enjoy more extensive exemptions from the jurisdiction of
the littoral state than do merchantmen and their crews—exemp-
tions that are properly described as immunities. Both the bases
for and the range of these immunities are, however, disputed.
The fiction of extraterritoriality enjoyed as great a vogue with
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respect to warships as with respect to embassies and was in-
fluential in shaping the law. The fiction has been vigorously at-
tacked, and was expressly repudiated by the Privy Council with
respect to a public vessel. 1
Rejection of the fiction of extraterritoriality by no means im-
plies there are no sound bases for the immunities of warships and
of their crews. It does, however, require a more searching in-
quiry into the factors which may support those immunities.
1 The fiction is supported by Oppenheim, 1 Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, In-
ternational Law 853 (8th ed. 1957), but the editor notes the decision of the
Privy Council in Chung Chi Cheung v. The King, [1939] A.C. 160 (Pr.
Council), 108 L.J.R. 17, a prosecution in a Hong Kong court for the murder
of the captain of the Chinese Maritime Customs cruiser Cheung Keng, an
armed public vessel, by a cabin boy when the vessel was in Hong Kong
territorial waters. Both the captain and cabin boy were British nationals.
In dismissing the cabin boy's appeal and holding that the Hong Kong court
had jurisdiction on the ground that China had waived its jurisdiction, after
noting the opposing views, that the immunity of warships is based on
extraterritoriality or that "the immunities do not depend on an objective
exterritoriality, but on implication of the domestic law," it was said at 167:
"There Lordships entertain no doubt that the latter is the correct
conclusion. It more accurately and logically represents the agreements
of nations which constitute international law, and alone is consistent
with the paramount necessity, expressed in general terms, for each
nation to protect itself from internal disorder by trying and punishing
offenders within its boundaries."
After reviewing the authorities bearing on the point, the opinion con-
tinued :
"Their Lordships have no hesitation in rejecting the doctrine of
exterritoriality * * * which regards the public ship 'as a floating portion
of the flag-State.' However the doctrine of exterritoriality is expressed,
it is a fiction, and legal fictions have a tendency to pass beyond their
appointed bounds and to harden into dangerous facts. The truth is
that the enunciators of the floating-island theory have failed to face
very obvious possibilities that make the doctrine quite impracticable
when tested by the actualities of life on board ship and ashore." Id.
at 174.
More than a century before, in Forbes v. Cochrane [1824] 2 B & C 448
at 467 Best, J., in discussing the liability of certain British naval officers
for refusing to restore slaves who had escaped to their ships from Florida,
said:
"I am decidedly of opinion that they were then no longer slaves. The
moment they put their feet on board of a British man of war, not lying
within the waters of East Florida (where, undoubtedly, the laws of that
country would prevail), those persons who before had been slaves, were
free." Cited, 2 Moore, International Law Digest, 578 (1906).
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It has been said that "The immunities of a vessel of war belong
to her as a complete instrument, made up of vessel and crew, and
intended to be used by the state for specific purposes; the ele-
ments of which she is composed are not capable of separate use
for those purposes ; they consequently are not exempted from the
local jurisdiction." 2 This can be read to mean that a warship
and its crew are so much an entity that their immunities neces-
sarily have the same origin, nature, and scope. On the other
hand, it can be read to mean that a warship and its crew serve
functions so interdependent that there can be no adequate basis
for an immunity for either if the situation does not involve some
connection between vessel and crew. The latter, it is submitted, is
the only acceptable sense in which the statement quoted may
be read.
A warship is a physical instrumentality of the state, designed,
as a plane, tank or gun is designed, to make the use of force
available in international disputes. The crew is an organized body
of men, brought together, trained, and subjected to a common
command and discipline to perform an assigned mission, sailing
and fighting the ship. The warship gives form and substance, in
terms of function, to the concept of a crew, as planes, guns and
tanks do to the concept of an air force or an army. The crew's
function is nevertheless separate and distinct from that of the
warship, however interdependent those functions may be. Further,
the immunities of a warship and of its crew can hardly be of the
same nature and scope. A warship is incapable of committing a
crime, though it may be the scene of a crime or the instrument
with which a crime is committed, e.g., a violation of the naviga-
tion laws. The only question of immunity which can arise with
respect to a warship is by whom enforcement action may be
exercised aboard her. Members of the crew may, however, com-
mit crimes, on board or ashore, in the performance of duty or as
private acts. Those acts may concern the flag state, the littoral
state, or even the state of which the accused or the victim is a
national. One should not limit in advance the analysis and ap-
praisal of the possible reasons for according immunities to a
warship and to its crew by the assumption they must have the
same origin, nature and scope.
2 Hall, International Law, 249 (8th ed., 1924). See also 2 Gidel, Droit
International Public de la Mer, 267 (1934)
.
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Three reasons, or groups of reasons, have been assigned for the
immunities commonly claimed for warships and their crews. These
are in essence the same as those advanced for the immunity of
land forces. They will be discussed at greater length later, but
need to be mentioned here. The first reason stems from the ideas
of the representative character of a warship, the independence
of states and the mutual respect of sovereigns. 3 Although there is
force in these ideas, it varies depending on whether one is speak-
ing of the warship or of its crew. A warship is a public vessel,
the property of a state, and as such may be said in a sense to have
a representative character. 4 If this alone is not persuasive—and
there is much recent authority that it is not—there are other
factors. It is also an instrumentality designed for and devoted to
one of the highest interests of the state, its security. If the in-
dependence of states, not as an abstract principle but in sub-
stantial terms, requires that any instrumentality of a state must
be free from foreign interference, it is a warship. Reference to
the mutual respect of sovereigns is less convincing with regard
to a warship, though one can look upon it as a symbol, as the flag
it flies is a symbol, of the state, to which respect is required.
The same ideas have a quite different impact with respect to the
crew. The captain and, in lesser degree, the other officers and the
seamen are representatives of the flag state, exercising delegated
powers. It cannot be said, however, that the independence of
states or the mutual respect of sovereigns requires that every
representative of a state, regardless of his capacity and activity,
is entitled to immunity. Perhaps it could be argued that the cap-
tain should be considered as entitled to immunity in terms of
these concepts, but as to the other officers and the seamen this
seems much more doubtful.
The second reason given for the immunities of warships and
their crews is military exigency, which is said to require that the
flag state retain complete control over the vessel and its crew. 5
The compelling character of this argument, applied to the war-
* See 2 Gidel, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 265.
* "We must observe here, with Wharton's commentator, Mr. Dana, that
the immunities enjoyed by warships depend more on their public character
than on their military character. They are accorded not to a warship but to
a national ship, vested as such with a certain character of sovereignty."
1 Calvo, Le Droit International 613 (3d ed., 1880).
6 See 2 Gidel, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 266, and the authorities there cited.
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ship, is evident. The threat to the security of the flag state would
be real and substantial if the authorities of a foreign state could
come on the vessel at will and exercise authority, necessarily in
derogation of the commander's. Their mere presence on the war-
ship could, because of the classified character of much of what is
found on a warship, endanger the flag state's security. What is
less clear is that military exigency requires the flag state to retain
exclusive control over the crew, both in their official and un-
official activities. While it is true that the flag state must retain
the power to enforce discipline, free of the interference of the
littoral state, it is far from obvious that subjecting the crew to
the criminal jurisdiction of the littoral state, at least with re-
spect to their unofficial activities ashore, necessarily involves an
intolerable interference with the flag state's control.
A third reason sometimes relied on for the immunities com-
monly claimed is the implied consent of the littoral state, but, as
Gidel remarks, this can hardly serve as an independent reason
since, unless a reason of substance exists, there can be no reason
for implying consent to any immunity. 6
Against these factors, which argue for the immunity of war-
ships and their crews, are to be weighed the reasons—in other
circumstances generally recognized as compelling—for acknowl-
edging the jurisdiction of the territorial state—"the paramount
necessity," as the court said in the Chung Chi Cheung case, "for
each nation to protect itself from internal disorder by trying and
punishing offenders within its borders." 7
IMMUNITY OF THE SHIP
A warship on the high seas is completely immune from the
jurisdiction of any state other than the flag state, 8 and much the
same appears to be true of a warship passing through territorial
waters. A warship, as a physical object, is likewise completely
immune from the enforcement jurisdiction of the littoral state
when in a foreign port, insofar as ordinary proceedings are con-
cerned. 9 "No legal proceedings can be taken against her either for
6 Ibid.
7 Supra, note 1, at 167.
8 Colombos, International Law of the Sea, 221 (4th ed., 1959) ; Hall, op.
cit. supra, note 2, at 307. See Article 8, Convention on the High Seas, 13
UST 2312, TIAS 5200.
9 This was the specific point involved in The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 116 (1812), although there the vessel entered in distress. Chief
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recovery of possession, or for damages for collision or for a
salvage reward, or for any other cause. 10 More important for
present purposes, the littoral state may not exercise enforcement
jurisdiction in any form on the vessel without the consent of the
commanding officer. 11 This is true whether the act which occa-
Justice Marshall, in holding the warship immune, said (p. 143) :
"But in all respects different, is the situation of a public armed ship.
She constitutes a part of the military force of her nation; acts under
the immediate and direct command of the sovereign; is employed by
him in national objects. He has many and powerful motives for pre-
venting those objects from being defeated by the interference of a
foreign state. Such interference can not take place without affecting his
power and his dignity. The implied license, therefore, under which
such vessel enters a friendly port, may reasonably be construed, and
it seems to the court, ought to be construed, as containing an exemp-
tion from the jurisdiction of the sovereign, within whose territory she
claims the rights of hospitality."
10 1 Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, op. cit. supra, note 1, at 853. See also 2
Hackworth, Digest of International Law 409 (1940-4) ; Colombos, op. cit.
supra, note 8, at 194-5; Art. 15, "Resolutions, Institute of International
Law," 34 Annuaire 475. Hall points out that the doubt raised regarding
the English rule by remarks of Lord Stowell in The Prins Frederik (1820),
2 Dodson 484 and by Sir R. Phillimore in The Chariek, L.R. 4 Admiralty
and Ecclesiastical Cases 93, were set at rest by the decision in The Con-
stitution (1879), L.R. 4 P.D. 39, refusing an application for a warrant for
the arrest of that American frigate and her cargo for a salvage claim, after
the American government objected to the exercise of jurisdiction and the
objection was supported by counsel for the crown. Hall, op. cit. supra, note
2, at 248. See also 2 Moore, op. cit. supra, note 1, at 579; 1 McNair, In-
ternational Law Opinions 92 (1956) opinion of 1871. Oppenheim remarks at
p. 853 (footnote) that "this rule became universally recognized only during
the nineteenth century."
The Restatement, Foreign Relations Law, Sec. 67, affirms the rule but
notes that the littoral state may assert a diplomatic claim.
11 Surprisingly enough, this rule, which may now be regarded as firmly
established, was at one time seriously questioned, particularly by the United
States. The Attorney General ruled in 1794 that a writ of habeas corpus
could be awarded where it was alleged an American subject was unlawfully
detained on a British warship in an American harbor. Bradford, Attorney
General, 1794, 1 Op. 47, 2 Moore, op. cit. supra, note 1, at 574. Moore's
account cites Hall, for whose report of the same incident see Hall, op. cit.
supra, note 2, at 238-9. Again in 1799, the then Attorney General ruled
that civil or criminal process might be served upon a person on board a
British warship lying in New York harbor. Lee, Attorney General, 1799, 1
Op. 87, 2 Moore, pp. 574-5. Lawrence notes that: "These views were by no
means confined to American lawyers. They seem to have been held by au-
thorities of the highest repute in England. * * * Such doctrine as these
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sions the assertion of jurisdiction took place on the vessel or
ashore, and whether it was committed by an officer or member of
the crew or a stranger to the vessel. 12 The right of a warship to
[Lord Stowell's] would reduce the immunities of a public vessel almost to
vanishing point. They would never probably have been acquiesced in on the
continent of Europe. * * *" Lawrence, Principles of International Law,
226-7 (7th ed. 1923). See also Hall, pp. 240-1.
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in The Schooner Exchange resulted, how-
ever, in a reversal of the American position, and was undoubtedly largely
responsible for the now seemingly general recognition of the view that en-
forcement jurisdiction may not be exercised on a foreign warship. See 2
Moore, op. cit. supra, note 1, at 578-79.
Hyde states that "At the present time a foreign vessel of war and the
occupants thereof are acknowledged to be exempt from local process." 2
Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United
States, 826 (1945). The Restatement, Foreign Relations Law, Section 52,
states the rule with a minor qualification. "Except as otherwise expressly
indicated by the coastal state, its consenting to the visit of a foreign naval
vessel * * * implies that it (a) waives the right to exercise aboard the
vessel its enforcement jurisdiction * * * except to the extent necessary to
prevent imminent injury to persons or property not involved in the opera-
tion of the vessel * * *."
The British authorities are reviewed by Hall, op. cit. supra, note 2, pp.
243-44. His conclusions are somewhat more guarded, since the British posi-
tion has not been entirely uniform. He notes that the French, German and
Italian authorities support the complete immunity of warships from enforce-
ment jurisdiction. Oppenheim states flatly that "No official of the littoral
state is allowed to board the vessel without special permission of the com-
mander." 1 Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, pp. 853-54. See also Colombos, op. cit.
supra, note 8, at 227. And see 1 McNair, op. cit. supra, note 10, at 90,
opinion of April 24, 1860, and at 91, opinion of March 7, 1862, both of which
support the immunity but rely on the fiction of extraterritoriality, as do some
of the early American authorities cited. See also Article 15 of the "Regula-
tions Concerning the Legal Status of Ships and Their Crews in Foreign
Ports," Institute of International Law, 1898, 17 Annuaire 277, and Art. 16 of
the "Resolutions of the Institute, 1928," 34 Annuaire 214.
United States Navy Regulations 1948, Article 0730, (GPO 1948), provide:
"The Commanding Officer shall not permit his command to be searched by
any person representing a foreign state nor permit any of the personnel
under his command to be removed from the command by such person, so
long as he has the power to resist." Cf. Article 0764, relating to examina-
tions by foreign customs and immigration officials.
12
"No occupant while remaining on board is subject to the local jurisdic-
tion, notwithstanding his infraction of the local criminal code by an act
committed on shore or taking effect there. * * * When a fugitive from justice
is once received on board of a foreign vessel of war within the territorial
waters of a State he is believed to be withdrawn from the local jurisdiction."
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give asylum to a fugitive has been much debated, but even if
there is no such right, the local authorities are still barred from
entering the vessel and taking the fugitive. 13
The wide recognition of these immunities of a warship suggests
that states generally regard the reasons supporting them, sum-
marized above, as conclusive. It is misleading, however, to re-
gard them as immunities from criminal jurisdiction—to which
only the last has any relevance in the usual sense. These immuni-




Whether the littoral state can extend its criminal law to apply
to acts which occur on the warship
—
granted it may take no
steps to enforce its law there—is a more difficult question. Re-
jection of the fiction of extraterritoriality implies that there is no
disability of the littoral state merely because the act takes place
on a warship, just as there is no such disability merely because
an act occurs in an embassy. Nor does the inviolability of the
vessel appear to be a basic factor. Effective enforcement by the
2 Hyde, op. cit. supra, note 11, at 826-29. "Even individuals who do not be-
long to the crew but who, after having committed a crime on the territory of
the littoral State, have taken refuge on board, cannot be forcibly taken off
the vessel * * *." 1 Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, op. cit. supra, note 1, at 854.
See also, Orfanidis v. Ministere Public, Mixed Court of Cassation, Egypt,
May 31, 1943, [1943-1945] Ann. Dig. 141 (No. 38) ; Anne and others v.
Ministere Public, Court of Cassation, Egypt, Dec. 13, 1943, [1943-1945]
Ann. Dig. 115 (No. 33) ; Ministere Public v. Korkoris, Court of Cassation,
Egypt, Dec. 11, 1944, [1943-1945] Ann. Dig. 120 (No. 34). And see Ex
parte Sulman, Supreme Court of South Africa, Cape of Good Hope Provincial
Division, July 15, 1942, [1941-1942] Ann. Dig. 247 (No. 64), applying the
doctrine to a merchant vessel requisitioned by the Netherlands government
in wartime.
18
"[I]t is wrong for a ship to harbour a criminal or a person charged
with non-political crimes. If, however, such a person succeeds in getting on
board, and is afforded refuge, he cannot be taken out of the vessel. No
entry can be made upon her for any purpose whatever." Hall, op. cit. supra,
note 2, at 246.
Article 21, "Resolutions, Institute of International Law," 1898, 17 An-
nuaire 278, reads: "Whatever shall be the status of persons on board a
war-ship, even when they have been wrongly received, if the commander
refuses to give them up, force may not be resorted to to ensure their recap-
ture, or visit and search exercised to that end."
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littoral state may require on-the-spot investigation and the right
to summon witnesses, both of which may be prevented or made
more difficult by the vessel's inviolability. This is at best, how-
ever, an argument of a secondary order. Fundamentally the dis-
ability, if it exists, must stem from the character of the actors,
the nature of their actions, and the relationship of both to the
warship, the flag state and the littoral state.
In the sense that the captain and crew of a warship are in
general required to obey the local law, there is no general dis-
ability of the littoral state to prescribe its application. Specifi-
cally, there is no disability, or correlative immunity, with respect
to acts which take effect externally to the ship, at least those in
the normal range of laws and regulations relating to navigation,
anchorage, quarantine, sanitation and the like. 14 When such laws
or regulations are violated, the littoral state may apply for re-
dress to the government of the flag state, or, in extreme cases,
order the ship out of its territory, or forcibly expel it, but
ordinary remedies are not available. 15 Such violations are, of
14 2 Hyde, op. cit. supra, note 10, at 827, 1 Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, op. cit.
supra, note 1, at 855; Colombos, op. cit. supra, note 8, at 227; 2 Gidel, op. cit.
supra, note 2, at 255. Mr. Hill, Acting Secretary of State, to Secretary of
the Navy, Oct. 6, 1899, M.S. Dom. Let. 399, 2 Moore, op. cit. supra, note 1,
at 514; Memo of Mr. S.C. Lemly, Judge Advocate General, U.S.N., com-
municated to Mr. Moore, Third Assistant Secretary of State, July 6, 1891,
id., p. 584. Hall, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 246, affirms the duty to obey such
laws and regulations, subject "to the exception, it is probable, of instances
only in which there is a special custom to the contrary."
15 See 1 McNair, International Law Opinions 93, 94 (1956), regarding the
case of the Enterprise, an armed vessel of the United States used as a
training ship, which entered a Bermuda harbor and, owing to a misunder-
standing, committed a breach of the quarantine regulations. The command-
ing officer was fined £10 and costs but he protested and the fine was not
enforced. The Law Officers to whom the matter was referred expressed the
opinion (December 17, 1897) that the vessel and her officers could not claim
exemption from the regulations, but "It does not, however, follow that the
vessel and her officers are subject to the jurisdiction of the local courts. * * *
[I]n our opinion the officer commanding such man-of-war is not liable to
proceedings in the local Courts, in respect of any act done by him in the
management of the vessel.
"The duty of observing the regulations of the port is one of international
obligation. The vessel is admitted on the implied terms of observing such
regulations. If they are broken she may be expelled—if such an extreme
step be necessary for the safety of the port. Diplomatic representation may
be made to the Government of the country to which the vessel belongs, and
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course, the acts of individuals rather than of vessels, and the
basis of the individuals' immunity is not clear, assuming that any
attempt to take enforcement action against them is made on
shore. A persuasive argument can be made in terms of military
exigency. 16 The same reason, fortified because there is at least
no physical disturbance of the peace of the port, supports an
immunity with respect to acts done on board in the performance
of duty.
Even as to private acts, military exigency may well provide an
adequate basis for immunity of the crew. The members of the
crew, so long as they are on board, can be said to be so much a
part of an organized body of men charged with handling the ship
that it would interfere with performance of the ship's mission if
the littoral state asserted jurisdiction over their conduct, even
if anything like a right to disregard such regulations were asserted, the
foreign Government might be informed that its vessels could not be admitted."
See, generally, Colombos, op. cit. supra, note 8, at 227.
16 The statement made in Comment c, Sec. 35 of Tentative Draft No. 2 of
the Restatement, Foreign Relations Law: "For the performance of official
duties aboard a vessel it is possible that a doctrine of non-liability might
develop to prevent the exercise of territorial jurisdiction against certain
naval personnel while ashore" is not repeated in the final version. "[C]ourts
will not assume jurisdiction over such vessel or its officers, while acting as
such, but leave controversies arising out of the acts of the vessel, and its
officers, while acting in their official character, for settlement through
diplomatic channels." United States v. Thierichens, 243 Fed. 419, 420
(D.C.E.D. Pa., 1917).
In The Owner of the Junk "Tung On Tai" etc. v. Gove; The Alexander,
1 Hong Kong L.R. (1906) 122, 2 Hackworth, op. cit. supra, note 10, at 419-
20, the United States naval collier Alexander was in collision with a Chinese
junk in Hong Kong waters. A civil suit against the commander of the
Alexander was dismissed, upon motion of the Attorney General, on the
ground the ship was immune and the immunity extended to the commander.
The court said: "* * * I therefore think that the Plaintiff's contention
cannot be maintained, and that the principles enunciated in The Parle-
ment Beige as applicable to foreign public ships, certainly cover the
case of the officers and crew on board, because they are under the
control and in the employ of a foreign Sovereign in national objects,
and because the jurisdiction of the court, if exercised, must divert their
public service from its destined public use * * * This * * * immunity
* * * exists only so long as he [the naval officer] forms part of the machine
known as a vessel of war, and commits the act of negligence with or by
means of such vessel, and when it is either in whole, or in part, under his
control. But whether such immunity can be claimed by the officer himself
I very much doubt." See also the case of The Enterprise, supra, note 15.
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though at the moment they are not technically on duty, in the
four hours on, eight hours off sense, or acting in performance of
duty. The fact that an act occurs on board is, in other words,
relevant in terms of the military exigency which supports the
crew's immunity, even though the crew do not share the war-
ship's immunity. Moreover, the crew while on the vessel are
under the direct and immediate command and disciplinary au-
thority of the commander. If any weight is to be given to the
argument that the assertion of jurisdiction by the littoral state
would interfere with the maintenance of discipline and the exer-
cise of needed control by the commander, it should be in these
circumstances. Merchant seamen are, at least on the basis of
comity, accorded an exemption in similar circumstances, subject
only to the qualification that the peace of the port is not dis-
turbed, no stranger is involved, and the local authorities are not
asked to intervene. Cumulatively all of the factors which dis-
tinguish members of the crew of a warship from merchant sea-
men would seem to justify saying that they should be accorded
immunity for acts on board the vessel. Presumptively the littoral
state has jurisdiction over acts that occur on a warship, as it does
over those that occur on a merchant vessel, when the vessels are
in its waters. But the same balancing of interests of the flag state
and the littoral state which justifies only the according of a quali-
fied exemption for merchant seamen can be said to require the
recognition of complete immunity for the crew of a warship. 17
Several writers state categorically that the flag state has ex-
clusive jurisdiction over acts which occur on the vessel,18 and in
17 Cf. 2 Gidel, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 290-1.
18 Oppenheim states, 1 Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, op. cit. supra, note 1, at
854, that "Crimes committed on board by persons in the service of the vessel
are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the commander and the other home
authorities." But it should be remembered that he accepted the fiction of
extraterritoriality of warships. Colombos, op. cit. supra, note 8, at 234,
says that "The commander of a man of war or public ship in a foreign
port or waters retains complete jurisdiction over the ship and her crew,
thus excluding entirely the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign. The
local jurisdiction is equally excluded in the case of disturbances on board
her, these having to be dealt with by her commander alone." Hall, op. cit.
supra, note 2, is more guarded, saying at 245: "Exceptions to this obliga-
tion [to obey the local law] exist, in the case of acts beginning and ending
on board the ship and taking no effect externally to her, firstly in all
matters in which the economy of the ship or the relations of persons on
board to each other are exclusively touched, and secondly to the extent that
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Chung Chi Cheung v. King, 19 the court took the same line, though
it should be noted that there the crime took place while the vessel
any special custom derogating from the territorial law may have been es-
tablished,
—
perhaps also in so far as the territorial law is contrary to what
may be called the public policy of the civilized world." See also 2 Gidel, op.
cit. supra, note 2, at 292.
Article 16 of the "Resolution of the Institute of International Law, 1898,"
17 Annuaire 277, reads: "Crimes and offenses committed on board these
ships or on the boats belonging to them, whether by members of the crew,
or by any others on board, shall come under the jurisdiction of the courts
of the nation to which the ship belongs and shall be judged according to
the laws of that nation, whatever be the nationality of the perpetrators or
the victims.
"Whenever the commander shall deliver the delinquent over to the local
authorities, the latter shall regain the jurisdiction which under ordinary
circumstances would belong to them."
Article 18 of the "Resolutions of 1928," 34 Annuaire 742, reflects, however,
a shift in emphasis from jurisdiction to prescribe to jurisdiction to enforce.
"Crimes and offenses committed on board warships, whether by members of
the crew or by any other persons on board, are withdrawn from the
exercise of the competence of the courts of the State of the port, as long as
the ship is there, whatever be the nationality of the perpetrators or the
victims. Nevertheless, if the commander delivers the delinquent to the
territorial authority, the latter shall regain the exercise of its normal com-
petence." 1 McNair, op. cit. supra, note 15, at 94, refers to an 1881 opinion
which "advised that a local Italian pretore had no right to hold an inquest
upon the cause of the death of a British seaman occurring on board a
British ship of war while in the port of Naples, though it was his duty,
once the body was transferred from the ship to the land, to satisfy himself
before permitting burial that the death had not resulted from a crime
committed within his jurisdiction on land."
Tentative Draft No. 2 of the Restatement, Foreign Relations Law, states
that "The question whether officers and crewmen are subject to enforce-
ment jurisdiction while on shore with respect to conduct aboard a vessel is
one not answered by authoritative decisions or precedents from state prac-
tice." Sec. 35, Comment c, at 107. This is not a statement that the jurisdic-
tion exists, and the officers and crew are not immune, but it does suggest
that the question is open and the absence of such jurisdiction in the littoral
state cannot be assumed. The statement is not repeated in the final version of
the Restatement.
19 Supra, note 1. The court said at 174, 176: "Immunities may well be
given in respect of the conduct of members of the crew to one another on
board ship. If one member of the crew assaults another on board, it would
be universally agreed that the local courts would not seek to exercise juris-
diction, and would decline it unless, indeed, they were invited to exercise it
by competent authority of the flag-nation. * * * In the present case the
question arises as to the murder of one officer and the attempted murder
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was in the territorial waters of Hong Kong, not in port. The
issue has been debated whether the littoral state can claim at least
concurrent jurisdiction where the accused or the victim or both
are, though members of the crew, nationals of the littoral state.
The weight of authority on this issue supports the view that
nationality is not a relevant factor.20
of another by a member of the crew. If nothing more arose the Chinese
Government could clearly have had jurisdiction over the offense * * *." See
also The Lone Star, Supreme Federal Court, Brazil, Nov. 22, 1944, [1947]
Ann. Dig. 84 (No. 31).
20 Hall appended a footnote to the comment quoted, note 18, reading: "The
case which, however, would be extremely rare on board a ship of war, of a
crime committed by a subject of the state within which the vessel is lying
against a fellow subject, would no doubt be an exception to this. It would
be the duty of the captain to surrender the criminal." Literally, the qualifica-
tion suggested is applicable to members of the crew as well as strangers to
the vessel.
As so read, the qualification was rejected in the Chung Chi Cheung case,
supra, note 1, at 176, where both the murderer and the victim were British
subjects: "It is difficult to see why the fact that either the victim or the
offender, or both, are local nationals should make a difference if both are
members of the crew."
The court quoted at 172 from the memorandum of Sir Alexander Cock-
burn, Lord Chief Justice, included in the "Report of the Royal Commission
on Fugitive Slaves," 1876, Command 1516, p. xiii:
"The rule which reason and good sense would, as it strikes me, prescribe,
would be that, as regards the discipline of a foreign ship and offences com-
mitted on board as between members of her crew towards one another,
matters should be left entirely to the law of the ship, and that should the
offender escape to the shore, he should, if taken, be given up to the com-
mander of the ship on demand, and should be tried on shore only if no such
demand be made. But if a crime be committed on board the ship upon a
local subject * * * the criminal * * * should be given up to the local au-
thorities."
The court commented that "[T]he Lord Chief Justice assumed that even
if a crime be committed on board by one member of the crew on another,
should the offender escape to shore and no demand be made for his return,
the territorial court would have jurisdiction. Their Lordships doubt whether,
when he was dealing with the case of a crime committed on board of a
local subject, he had present to his mind the possibility of the local subject
being a member of the crew."
Hall's comment posited the case where both the criminal and the victim
were subjects of the littoral state, and that was the actual situation in
Chung Chi Cheung. The case in which the criminal only is a subject is, of
course, weaker, and that in which the victim only is a subject is weaker still.
See also 2 Gidel, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 292: "If the author of the un-
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B. Strangers
No reason suggests itself why a stranger to the vessel who
commits an offense aboard a warship in a foreign port should
enjoy any immunity from the jurisdiction of the littoral state.
Fundamentally, the littoral state has jurisdiction on the terri-
torial principle, and an affirmative reason must exist to deprive it
of its competence. The fact the place of the offense was a foreign
warship hardly seems adequate, unless one reverts to the fiction
of extraterritoriality. No such immunity is recognized with re-
spect to visitors to a merchant vessel or an embassy, and no in-
terest of the flag state is apparent which would justify giving
strangers to a warship a superior status. Recognition of an
obligation of the commander to deliver such an offender to the
local authorities seems desirable,21 although the flag state should
be recognized as having a secondary competence.
lawful act is a member of the crew, the flag state has exclusive jurisdiction.
The quality of member of the crew predominates over all other circum-
stances, even if the individual author of the offense is a national of the
riparian state."
21 Writers have on occasion either drawn no distinction between the crew
and others on board, or considered both entitled to the same immunity. De
Martens, however, argued long ago that
:
"No juridical reason exists for declaring that in all cases crimes com-
mitted on warships are excluded from the jurisdiction of the local au-
thorities. One can admit that the commander of the ship and the crew
should not be subject to such authorities. But for what reason should
this privilege be extended to individuals who, forming no part of the
crew, have committed a crime on board a warship? The exterritoriality
of such ships, thus understood, would become up to a certain point con-
trary to their own security and would be in opposition to the rights and
the dignity of States in whose water they sailed." 2 De Martens,
Traite de Droit International 337 (1886).
He notes that the opinion expressed was not that of the majority of writers
on international law, but it has the support of Gidel, op. cit. supra, note 2, at
293-4, although Gidel would recognize the concurrent jurisdiction of the
flag state where the victim was a member of the crew.
Colombos takes the position, op. cit. supra, note 8, at 234, that: "If a
crime is committed on board a warship by a person not a member of the
ship's crew and not belonging to her, the commanding officer may with
propriety hand the accused over to the local authorities, but he cannot be
compelled to do so. The only exception appears to be in the case of a
crime committed on board the warship by a national of the territorial State
against a fellow-subject. In such a case, which must be extremely rare, it
would be the duty of the commander to surrender the criminal to the local
authorities," citing Article 18 of the Stockholm resolutions, see footnote 18,
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IMMUNITY OF THE CREW—ACTS ON SHORE
Any blanket of immunity that the officers and crew of a war-
ship may enjoy on board does not cover them on shore. All of
the crew of a warship, including, seemingly, the commander, are
subject to the jurisdiction of the littoral state while ashore in
pursuit of their private interests.22 The only dispute is over
supra. It is submitted that the obligation of the commander to deliver the
offender to the local authorities should be recognized in all cases, on the
territorial principle alone, without requiring reinforcement either from the
nationality or the passive personality principle. So long as it is recognized
that the littoral state can not exercise enforcement jurisdiction on the
vessel—breach of the commander's obligation to deliver the accused could
be sanctioned only through diplomatic channels—the interests of the flag
state would appear to be adequately safeguarded.
The court in Chung Chi Cheung v. King, supra, note 1, at 174, recognized
the jurisdiction of the territorial state, but did not comment on the duty of
the commander to deliver the offender to the local authorities, saying
:
"But if a resident in the receiving State visited the public ship and
committed theft, and returned to shore, is it conceivable that when he
was arrested on shore, and shore witnesses were necessary to prove
dealings with the stolen goods, and identify the offender, the local courts
would have no jurisdiction? What is the captain of the public ship to do?
Can he claim to have the local national surrendered to him? He would
have no claim to the witnesses, or to compel their testimony in advance
or otherwise. He naturally would leave the case to the local courts.
* * * The result of any such doctrine [extraterritoriality] would be not
to promote the power and dignity of the foreign sovereign, but to lower
them by allowing injuries committed in his public ships or embassies
to go unpunished."
Article 9 of the Montevideo Treaty on International Penal Lavj of March
19, 1940 provides: "If only individuals who are not members of the crew of
the war vessel or aircraft participate in the commission, on board, of such
acts, the trial and punishment shall proceed in accordance with the laws of
the State in whose territorial waters the vessel or aircraft is found." See
The Lone Star, supra, note 19.
United States Navy Regulations 1948 provide in Article 0732:
"1. The commanding officer shall keep under restraint or surveillance,
as necessary, any person not in the armed services of the United States who
is found under incriminating or irregular circumstances within the command,
and shall immediately initiate an investigation.
"3. If the investigation indicates that such person has committed or at-
tempted to commit an offense punishable under the authority of the com-
manding officer, the latter shall take such action as he deems necessary."
12
"The officers of a vessel of war belonging to a friendly foreign nation
can not set up extraterritoriality when unofficially on shore in a port in
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whether they are subject to such jurisdiction while ashore in a
duty status.
whose harbor their vessel is temporarily moored." 2 Moore, op. cit. supra,
note 1, at 585, citing Mr. Randolph, Secretary of State, to Mr. Hammond,
July 23, 1794, 7, M.S. Dom. Let. 55; Mr. Buchanan, Secretary of State, to
Mr. Leal, Brazilian charge, August 30, 1847, S. Ex. Doc. 35, 30 Cong. 1
sess. 29, id., at 586, concerning the arrest in Rio de Janeiro of a lieutenant
and three sailors of the U.S.S. Saratoga, when one man "drew his knife on
his fellow sailor whilst on shore." "* * * any person * * * attached to such
man of war, charged with an offence on shore, is liable to arrest therefor, in
the country where the offence may have been committed." Mr. Fish, Secre-
tary of State, to Commodore Case, January 27, 1872, 92 M.S. Dom. Let. 322,
2 Moore, p. 588; the Forte, 5 Moore, International Arbitrations 4925-28
(1898), 2 Moore, op. cit., supra, note 1, at 587, in which Leopold of Belgium,
as arbitrator, held for Brazil in a dispute with Great Britain over the arrest
of a chaplain, lieutenant and midshipmen of the Forte ashore in Brazil. See
also Japan v. Smith and Stinner, High Court of Osaka (Sixth Criminal
Division), Nov. 5, 1952, [1952] Int'l L. Rep. 22 (No. 47), in which Japan
asserted jurisdiction over British sailors from the warship Belfast for an
offence committed ashore, although the warship had been engaged in action
in Korean waters until just before her visit to Kobe.
Of particular interest is the incident reported in 2 Hackworth, op. cit.
supra, note 10, at 422, citing Ambassador O'Brien to Secretary Knox, tele-
gram of June 5, 1911, and Mr. Knox to Mr. O'Brien, telegram of June 7,
1911, M.S. Department of State, file 394.112 At S/-, 3. Hackworth's re-
port states
:
"On June 5, 1911, the Ambassador in Japan reported to the Depart-
ment of State the murder of one United States naval enlisted man by
another in a United States naval hospital ashore. The Ambassador
stated that he informally requested of the Japanese Foreign Office that
American naval officials be allowed to take jurisdiction, but that the
request had been refused. The Department, on June 7, 1911, instructed
the Ambassador that 'Unless the practice of other nations is contrary,
you should concede jurisdiction to Japan, at the same time indicating
that this Government would prefer by courtesy to try the prisoner.'
The man was later tried and convicted by a Japanese court."
It should be noted that both the murderer and his victim were Americans
and enlisted men in the Navy; it does not appear from the report, but the
murderer may have been on duty; and, finally, the murder occurred in a
United States naval hospital. See also Colombos, op. cit. supra, note 8, at
236 ; 2 Gidel, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 297.
See the discussion regarding the status of the commander, 2 Gidel, pp.
299-300, citing the comments of other writers. It is Gidel's conclusion that
one can not demonstrate the existence of a custom giving special status to
the commander, and his judgment that the commander should, in principle,
be equally subject to the local jurisdiction. See United States v. Thierichens,
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Such respected authorities as Hyde 23 and Hall 24 would deny
the immunity even in this case, but other writers
—
perhaps the
243 Fed. 419 (D.C.E.D. Pa., 1917), in which the defendant was the com-
manding officer of the German cruiser Prinz Eitel Friedrich.
The Restatement, Foreign Relations Law, Comment c to Sec. 52, p. 177,
states that "The rule stated in this Section has no application to the person-
nel of a vessel while they are ashore," and Illustration 3, following the
Comment, states that the captain of a naval vessel is subject to the en-
forcement jurisdiction of the littoral state if he "negligently kills Z while
driving a car on shore in the course of making an official call."
" "The exemption enjoyed by persons officially connected with and on
board of a foreign public vessel does not accompany them after they have
left the ship or its tenders and are on shore. * * *.
"Officers and crews of foreign vessels of war, who commit offenses while
ashore, are generally subject to local prosecution. * * *."
"Possibly the commander of a vessel of war who goes ashore in order to
accomplish an end directly connected with or incidental to the public business
which brought his vessel into the port, ought not, while so engaged, to be
amenable to local process, provided he does not, in the course of his errand,
violate the local law. It is believed he should not, for example, be arrested
for an offense committed during a previous visit, or be served with process
in a civil suit charging him with tortious conduct at any prior time. It
is not known, however, that such an exemption within the limits stated
has been claimed or granted by the United States." 2 Hyde, op. cit. supra,
note 10, at 830. No reason is advanced for the suggested distinction be-
tween past and present offenses.
See also the Restatement, Foreign Relations Law, Comment c to Sec. 52,
and Illustration 3, p. 177.
2i Hall, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 249. But an editor's footnote says
:
"Opinion on this point is divided. Some writers adopt the rule stated in the
text unqualifiedly. (J.B. Moore, Dig. II Sec. 256; Hannis Taylor, Sec. 261;
Hyde, International Law, i, Sec. 255). Others modify it by requiring notifica-
tion of the arrest of a member of the crew to the ship's commander and
giving him the power of demanding that local jurisdiction shall be so
exercised as to meet the requirements of moral justice, e.g., through consular
intervention (Ortolan, Dip. de la Mer, i, 268; Phillimore, i, Sec. 346).
Others draw a distinction between the purposes for which the landing took
place; if it were for an object connected with naval duty, the members of
the crew should be immune; if for some other object, such as recreation, he
should not be (Perels, 121-5; Bonfils, Sec. 620). This appears to be the
view of most writers (Oppenheim, i, Sec. 451). The case of the Forte is
inconclusive. * * * The practice in Great Britain appears to be that in
case of serious offences the offender is dealt with by the local authorities,
but in case of minor offences, such as drunkenness, the offender is simply
detained until he can be handed over to a superior officer of the ship to
which he belongs, but this is done as a matter of courtesy."
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majority—would recognize it.25 The former have the support of
a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada,26 the latter of the
Mixed Court of Cassation of Egypt, though these decisions can be
distinguished because they arose in wartime.27
25
"The position of officers and crew when ashore is not quite free from
doubt. The practice generally followed is to apply the principle of exterri-
toriality to them when they are on land in uniform and in an official capacity
connected with the service of their ship. But if they are ashore not in uni-
form or on official business, they are subject to the territorial jurisdiction of
the littoral State, which is entitled to prosecute them for any crimes against
the local laws. In the case of minor offences, it is usual to hand over, on
grounds of international comity, the wrongdoers to the commanding officer
for him to deal with, but there is no obligation to do so." Colombos, op. cit.
supra, note 8, at 236. Oppenheim notes that "the position of the commander
and crew of a man-of-war in a foreign port when they are on land is con-
troversial. The majority of writers distinguish between a stay on land in the
service of the man-of-war and a stay for other purposes." 1 Lauterpacht-
Oppenheim, op. cit. supra, note 1, at 855.
26 Sir Lyman P. Duft, C.J.C., with whom Hudson, J., concurred, concluded
:
"The members of a crew of an armed ship of the United States are
exempt from the jurisdiction of the criminal courts of Canada in respect of
an offence committed on board ship by one member of the crew against
another member of the crew and generally in respect of acts which exclu-
sively concern the internal discipline of the ship. As regards offences com-
mitted on shore by members of the crew, they are not exempt from the
jurisdiction of the criminal courts of Canada, but the criminal courts of
Canada do not exercise jurisdiction in respect of such offences where the
offence is one committed by one member of the crew against another mem-
ber of the crew, except at the request of the commander of the ship."
Reference Re Exemption of U.S. Forces from Canadian Criminal Law
[1943], 4 D.L.R. 11, 25. Rand, J., concurred on this point. Ibid., p. 51.
37 Triandafilou v. Ministere Public, Mixed Courts in Egypt Court of Cassa-
tion, June 29, 1942, 39 A.J.I.L. 345. Triandafilou, a Greek subject, was a
sailor on the torpedo boat destroyer Panther of the Greek fleet anchored in
Alexandria. He came ashore to purchase food for the needs of the ship,
with permission to return on board by midnight. On coming out of a bar on
the Place Mohamed Aly in a state of intoxication some minutes before mid-
night, he struck with a dagger an agent of the local police who, with the
purpose of calming a disturbance which had broken out among other per-
sons, was about to conduct such other persons to the station.
The court noted that it was pertinent "to distinguish between the im-
munity which the vessel itself enjoys, as representing the country whose
flag it flies, and the personal immunity which the crew would enjoy, 'by way
of an extension/ which would result in withdrawing the crew to a greater
or less degree from the territorial jurisdiction even when they had gone on
land * * *." After commenting on the conflict among writers, noting Art.
20 of the "Resolutions of the Institute," which "can be considered as stating
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The language of the Mixed Court of Cassation that "it is in
short the immunity of the vessel which projects itself beyond the
vessel for the realization of its own ends" may have been un-
fortunate. It appears to mean simply that so long as members of
the crew are on duty, even though they may be on shore, there is
a functional basis for their immunity. This is a position for
which support can be found. The immunities of diplomats are of
even wider scope, and are said to be justified on a functional
basis. The opposing view need not depend on the theory the war-
ship and crew are one, and cannot be immune when physically
separated. It can stem from the belief that compelling military
need for the immunity of the crew can exist only if they are on
the warship. At least it can be said that the primary functions of
the crew are performed on board, and the military need for their
immunity is more clearly discernible when they are on board.
Gidel makes the point that the difficulties of determining
whether an act was an act "de service" may explain why im-
munity for such acts on shore has not had wider support.28 Later
decisions of the Mixed Courts of Egypt, limiting the doctrine of
the Triandafilou case that "these words should be interpreted not
the latest holding of international law on the subject" and denying that, as
a member of a visiting force, the accused was protected by any general
immunity, either under international law or because of the Anglo-Egyptian
treaty, the court said that "the sole question which presents itself * * * is
that of knowing whether Triandafilou was or was not carrying out a mis-
sion under instructions at the moment when he committed the aggres-
sion * * *." In deciding that he was, and ordering Triandafilou set at
liberty, it said
:
"Whereas if the members of the crew of a warship enjoy the immunity
from jurisdiction of the vessel itself when they are on shore this is only
true in so far as they can be considered as agents for executing orders
which are given them in the interests of the vessel; whereas it is in short
the immunity of the vessel which projects itself beyond the vessel for the
realization of its own ends; whereas such is the basis of the principle which
withdraws them from the local jurisdiction when they are on duty; whereas
it follows that these words should be interpreted not with reference to the
activities of him who has received the order but with reference to him who
has given the order and who must take cognizance of its execution; and
whereas in the instant case the sailor Triandafilou did not return on board
to give an account of his commission, and whereas he was therefore still on
duty when he committed the aggression with which he was charged; whereas
it results from these considerations that the first ground for the appeal is
well founded. * * *"
88 2 Gidel, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 295.
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with reference to the activities of him who has received the order
but with reference to him who has given the order/' illustrate the
difficulty. 29 There is a discernible distinction—though one not al-
ways easy to draw in a given situation—between an act done
while on duty and one done in the performance of duty. The
exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the receiving state in the
latter situation involves a much more direct interference with the
sending state's conduct of its affairs, and poses the dilemma of
conflicting duties for the actor. There is need, then, for more
precise analysis before the conflicting interests of the sending and
receiving state can be weighed. It should not be forgotten, how-
ever, that a criminal offense on shore creates more than a moral
disturbance of the peace of the port, so that the littoral state has
a greater interest in asserting jurisdiction than if it takes place
on the vessel. 30
It has been pointed out that a party of sailors on duty ashore
may have the status of an "organized force" of "friendly force,"
with whatever added claim to immunity this may entail. 31 The
29 Gounaris v. Ministere Public, Egypt, Mixed Court of Cassation, May 10,
1943 [1943-1945] Ann. Dig. 152 (No. 41).
80 No distinction is apparently made on the basis of the nationality of the
victim, but in practice this may be crucial. Thus: "In September 1926, when
a seaman of the U.S. destroyer Sharkey died in England as a result of
wounds received in a shooting affray with another seaman of the U.S.
destroyer Lardner in the outskirts of Gravesend, the British Government
consented, on the application of the American Ambassador in London, and
as a matter of international courtesy, to hand over the culprit to the Ameri-
can authorities, although he had already been convicted by a coroner's jury
of 'wilful murder.' In the statement issued by the Home Secretary, the
opinion of the British Government was expressed that 'in the special cir-
cumstances of this case, a United States tribunal would be the more con-
venient Court,' particularly in view of the 'assurance given by the Ambassa-
dor' that the guilty person would be dealt with in accordance with the U.S.
Navy Court-martial Regulations. 'In coming to this decision, the Secretary
of State had in mind the fact that both the accused and the injured seaman
belonged to the U.S. Navy and that no British subject was directly con-
cerned'." Colombos, op. tit. supra, note 8, at 236.
81 Hyde states (2 Hyde, op. tit. supra, note 10, at 830), that "If a body of
sailors under the command of an officer is permitted to land as an organized
force, as for the purpose of taking part in a local parade, the members are
doubtless exempt from the local jurisdiction, not, however, on account of
their connection with a public vessel, but because they constitute an
organized force of a foreign State permitted to enter the national domain,"
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distinction between such a party and an individual sailor ashore
on duty is significant, particularly if the specific consent of the
littoral state to the landing of the party, e.g., a shore patrol, is
required. This should not, however, be viewed as an odd reinvoca-
tion of the doctrine of extraterritoriality. An individual sailor
on shore on duty may or may not be entitled to immunity. In the
appraisal of his claim, however, he should not be likened to a
soldier, stationed with his unit in France, who crosses into
Switzerland. The warship and the members of the crew on shore
are still in the same state, and when it becomes relevant, that fact
should be accepted.32
The flag state can certainly extend its law to conduct on board
its warships, even in foreign ports. 33 Direct authority with re-
spect to its right to exercise enforcement jurisdiction aboard such
ships is hard to come by, but certainly it is no less extensive than
on merchant vessels and may well be greater.34 Enforcement
jurisdiction may not, however, in any case be exercised on shore
without the consent of the territorial sovereign. Such jurisdic-
tion is in fact exercised by consent in many instances but only to
curb minor excesses, and the authority of the local police is in no
sense superseded.35 The disability applies particularly to the
citing, inter alia, the Tampico Incident, 2 Hackworth, op. cit. supra, note
10, at 420-21.
The Reporter's Notes to Sec. 52 of the Restatement, Foreign Relations
Law, p. 178, take the same approach, though the conclusion is different.
82 See GidePs comment on the views expressed by Van Praag, 2 Gidel, op.
cit. supra, note 2, at 296.
88 1 Hyde, op. cit. supra, note 10, at 800.
34 Sec. 52, p. 176, of the Restatement, Foreign Relations Law, states that:
"Except as otherwise expressly indicated by the coastal state, its consenting
to the visit of a foreign naval vessel * * * implies that it * * *
(b) consents to the exercise by the foreign state of such of its enforce-
ment jurisdiction * * * as is necessary for the internal management and
discipline of the vessel."
Comment (e), p. 177, states that "The exercise by the state of the vessel,
of the enforcement jurisdiction that it has * * * is limited to detention, the
inflicting of minor punishment or the holding of summary courts martial.
It does not include the inflicting of major punishment such as the death
penalty."
United States Navy Regulations 1948, Article 0732, contemplate the
exercise of limited enforcement jurisdiction on the vessel even with respect
to strangers to the vessel. Op. cit. supra, note 21.
88
"For reasons of courtesy and expediency, a usage has arisen permitting
foreign officers to seize and take on board their ships, without obstruction,
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arrest of deserters, since, at least if they are not apprehended in
the act of deserting they can be said to have broken, de facto,
their link to the warship. 36
members of crews who have become intoxicated and whose offences have not
been directed against persons or property ashore. * * *" 2 Hyde, op. cit.
supra, note 10, at 831.
"In the ports of all countries where foreign men-of-war resort, when
sailors go ashore, become intoxicated and violate police regulations by
quarreling with brother sailors—especially where they have insulted or
injured none of the citizens of the country—their officers are always per-
mitted to seize them and take them on board without obstruction, unless
they have been first apprehended by the police. This is a custom, founded on
courtesy, among all nations." Mr. Buchanan, Secretary of State, to Mr. Leal,
Brazilian charge, Aug. 30, 1847, S. Ex. Doc. 35, 30 Cong. 1 Sess. 28, 32;
2 Moore, op. cit. supra, note 1, at 589.
The United States Navy Regulations 19^8 are strict and explicit. Article
0625 provides for shore patrols "to maintain order and suppress any un-
seemly conduct on the part of any member of the liberty party. The senior
patrol officer shall communicate with the chief of police or other local
officials and make such arrangements as may be practicable to aid the
patrol in properly carrying out its work.
2. A patrol shall not be landed in any foreign port without first obtaining
the consent of the proper local authorities. Tact must be used in requesting
the permission, and unless it is willingly and cordially given, the patrol
shall not be landed. If consent cannot be obtained, the size of the liberty
parties shall be held to such limits as may be necessary to render dis-
turbances unlikely. (Emphasis added.)
3. Officers and men on patrol duty in a foreign country shall be un-
armed * * *."
Article 0622 provides:
"1. The senior officer present shall * * * respect the territorial authority
of nations in amity with the United States.
2. Unless permission has been obtained from the local authorities:
(a) No armed force * * * shall be landed."
3e
"Should any members of the crew desert in a foreign port, the com-
manding officer must not attempt to arrest them ashore; to do so would be a
violation of the jurisdiction of the local sovereign." Colombos, op. cit. supra,
note 8, at 237, citing the case in 1905 in which the commander of the Ger-
man gunboat Panther sent on shore in Brazil a search party composed of
twelve petty officers and sailors in uniform, together with three officers in
plain clothes, who entered several houses and forced some of the local in-
habitants to help in the search for a missing seaman who had not returned
from leave on shore. Brazil protested and Germany disavowed the com-
mander's acts.
Hyde observes that "For reasons of courtesy and expediency, a usage has
arisen permitting foreign officers * * * to exercise the customary authority
for the maintenance of discipline over seamen, remaining ostensibly within
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Writers have differed in the weight they have given precedents
regarding the crews of warships in situations involving land
forces. If the approach taken emphasizes the warship as an in-
strumentality, there is no precise analogy with land forces, though
where land forces man an installation in an assigned area, the
parallel is close.37 Otherwise, though one can speak of an organ-
ized body of men performing an assigned mission on behalf of the
sending state, the absence of a physical entity, like a warship,
which gives form to the concept, makes the argument less con-
vincing.
A warship in a foreign port may well present a less serious
threat both to the security of the littoral state and to its in-
habitants than a land force stationed on its territory. Foreign
the foreign naval service, and subject to its de facto control. Such officers
obviously possess no right, however, to arrest seamen who have deserted and
escaped from actual control." 2 Hyde, op. cit. supra, note 10, at 831. Hyde
cites Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, in which the court observed:
"[W]e have no doubt that, under the case above cited, the foreign officer
may exercise his accustomed authority for the maintenance of discipline, and
perhaps arrest a deserter dum fervit opus, and to that extent this country
waives its jurisdiction over the foreign crew or command." For criticism of
this statement, see 2 Gidel, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 379.
In The U.S.S. Mohecan, a midshipman who had gone ashore in Brazil
fired five shots in the streets of the city at one of his boatmen who at-
tempted to desert. He was arrested and taken before the chief of police,
who discharged him, allegedly with a reprimand. The Department of State
stated that the act of the midshipman "in firing a pistol at a deserter in a
street of Maranham was a breach of the peace, offensive to the dignity of
Brazil, which the Government of that country may well expect the United
States to disallow and censure." Mr. Seward, Secretary of State, to Mr.
Webb, Jan. 23, 1867, M.S. Inst. Brazil, XVI, 162; 2 Moore, op. cit. supra,
note 1, at 590.
The case could, however, be distinguished on the ground the midshipman
displayed excessive zeal in resorting to gunfire.
The United States Navy Regulations 19^8 contemplate that men may be
landed to capture deserters with the permission of the local authorities
(Article 0622, note 34, supra) and the Queen's Regulations and Admiralty
Instructions of Great Britain do also. Colombos, op. cit. supra, note 8, at 237.
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"The immunity of a foreign vessel of war is frequently said to apply
in respect of members of the crew while on shore and 'on duty/ This un-
doubtedly has furnished the concept applied by Oppenheim to an army.
Based on the theory of exterritoriality, the latter is a 'body' and immunity
beyond its 'lines' is confined to members on duty." Rand, J. in References
Re Exemption of U.S. Forces from Candian Criminal Law, (1943) 4 D.L.R.
11, 47.
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land forces are likely to intermingle more with the inhabitants
and to have more frequent contact with them, over a longer
period, than the crew of a warship. Maintaining strict discipline
over the crew of a warship during a short visit is easier than
maintaining it over land forces during an extended stay. The
distinction is recognized in the differentiation made between the
entrance of a warship to a foreign port without specific permis-
sion and the requirement that a land force obtain express permis-
sion before it enters foreign territory. 38
It is difficult on the other hand to discern any reason why troops
on foreign territory are more entitled to immunity from the juris-
diction of the territorial state than the crew of visiting warships.
Such distinctions as can be made point in the other direction. But
even if their situations are treated as identical, precedents with
respect to the crews of warships offer little comfort to those who
believe visiting land forces should enjoy complete immunity from
the receiving state's jurisdiction. No clear basis appears for dis-
tinguishing between crews on shore on leave and troops off duty
in a neighboring town.
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"But the role which is applicable to armies, does not appear to be ap-
plicable to ships of war entering the ports of a friendly power. The injury
inseparable from the march of an army through an inhabited country, and
the dangers, often, indeed, generally, attending it, do not ensue from ad-
mitting a ship of war, without special license, into a foreign port." The
Schooner Exchange, op. cit. supra, note 9, at 140.
The Restatement, Foreign Relations Law, recognizes the distinction. Com-
ment a to Sec. 52, p. 176, states that "In the case of foreign naval vessels,
notification of an intended visit is customary. It is not necessary that the
coastal state expressly communicate in return its consent to the visit. The
mere fact that it does not expressly prohibit the visit is sufficient consent."
But Sec. 57, p. 183, states that "In time of peace, a force of a state has no
right to be present in the territory of another state without the express
consent of the territorial state," and Comment a to that section distinguishes
the case of a naval vessel entering a port. Comment b, p. 184, notes that
"The entry of a foreign force into the territory of a state is too important
a matter to be based upon mere implication of consent by the terri-
torial state."
